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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EQUAL
CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act' (ECOA) was enacted in
19742 to prohibit discrimination based on sex or marital status by
creditors against credit applicants. 3 In 1976, the ECOA was
amended to expand the list of prohibited discriminatory criteria•
and to strengthen the enforcement provisions of the original Act. 5
Pursuant to one of the amendments, the Federal Reserve Board
promulgated regulations to implement the provisions of the Act,
known collectively as Regulation B. 8
It is vital that innovative legislation of this type be periodically
reexamined to discover whether the purposes for which it was
enacted are being fulfilled. 7 This article will first examine the
legislative history of the ECOA to discover (1) the impetus for its
enactment; (2) the views of proponents and opponents of the
legislation concerning the presence of credit discrimination, its
proper cure, and the proposed provisions of the bills introduced
to deal with the problem; and (3) the congressional intent as to
the use of various credit-granting factors described by the Act. 8
15 U,S,C, §§ 1691-1691e (1976).
Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974).
1
Section 502 of Pub. L. No. 93-495 provides:
The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status. Economic stabilization would be enhanced and competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of credit would be strengthened by an absence of discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status, as well as the informed use of
credit which_ Congress has heretofore sought to promote. It is the purpose of this
Act to require that financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension
of credit make that credit available to all creditworthy customers without regard
to sex or marital status.
' The amendments added race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of income
from public assistance programs, and the good faith exercise of legal rights under the
Consumer Credit Protection Act as applicant characteristics that creditors could not use
to discriminate in the granting of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
1
See notes 33-41 and accompanying text infra.
' 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1979).
' The 1976 amendments to ECOA promote this goal by requiring the Federal Reserve
Board to make an annual report to Congress on the operation of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691f
(1976).
• See Part I infra.
I
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Regulation B 9 will then be similarly examined to find out how the
broad mandates of the ECOA have been made concrete for the
use of creditors.1° Finally, the article will focus on a nationwide
survey of consumers conducted by the Survey Research Center of
the University of Michigan, concentrating on questions which
probe credit refusals and the perceived reasons for such refusals.
The article will fully describe the survey as well as the model and
statistical techniques used to interpret the survey results. 11 Those
results will be utilized to suggest changes in the ECOA and Regulation B so that they better reflect the public policy dictated by
Congress. 12

I.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT

A.

History of the Act: ECOA of 1974

The problems of sex discrimination in consumer credit transactions first gained widespread public attention in 1972 with publication of the National Commission on Consumer Finance report
which concluded that there were "widespread instances of unwarranted discrimination in the granting of credit to women." 13 A
series of law review articles built upon the Commission's findings
and proposed various remedies, including federal legislation. 14
The problem was brought directly to congressional attention in
two hearings, 15 leading to a Senate report which cited no fewer
' See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
•• See Part II infra.
11
See Part IV infra.
" See Part VI infra.
13
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, REPORT (1972) [hereinafter cited as
NCCF REPORT], at 160. The Commission heard testimony which revealed particular
problems in the following areas:
(1) Single women have more trouble than single men in obtaining credit.
(2) Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for credit,
usually in her husband's name.
(3) Creditors are unwilling to extend credit to a married woman in her own
name.
(4) Creditors are often unwilling to consider the wife's income when a married
couple applied for credit.
(5) Women who are divorced or widowed have trouble reestablishing credit.
Women who are separated have a particularly difficult time, since the accounts
may still be in her husband's name.
Id. at 152-53.
" See Gates, Credit Discrimination Again.st Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND.
L. REv. 409 (1974); Littlefield, Sex Based Discrimination and Credit Granting Process, 5
CONN. L. REv. 575 (1973); Note, The Discredited American Woman: Sex Discrimination
in Con.sumer Credit, 5 U. CALIF. D.L. REv. 61 (1973); Comment, Women and Credit, 12
DuQ. L. REv. 863 (1974).

11

Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic
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than thirteen common types of credit discrimination based on sex
and marital status. 18 In light of such evidence, Congress passed
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.17
The ECOA in 1974 prohibited discrimination by creditors
"against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status with
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction, " 18 though inquiries
into an applicant's marital status were allowed under certain
conditions. 19 The Federal Reserve Board was empowered to promulgate appropriate regulations. 20 Further provisions assigned
administrative enforcement duties to several agencies, depending
on the type of creditor involved, with overall enforcement authority given to the Federal Trade Commission. 21 Creditors were made
Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856
and H.R. 14908 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Credit
Discrimination Hearings].
11 S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973). The thirteen types of discrimination
included the five cited by the NCCF REPORT, see note 13 supra, as well as the following:
(1) Arbitrary refusal to consider alimony and child support as a valid source of
income when such source is subject to validation.
(2) Applying stricter standards to married applicants where the wife rather than
the husband is the primary supporter for the family.
(3) Requesting or using information concerning birth control practices in evaluating any credit application.
(4) Requesting or using information concerning the creditworthiness of a spouse
where an otherwise creditworthy married person applies for credit as an individual.
(5) Refusing to issue separate accounts to married persons where each would be
creditworthy if unmarried.
(6) Considering as "dependents" spouses who are employed and not actually
dependent on the applicant.
·
(7) Use of a credit scoring system that applies different values depending on sex
or marital status.
(8) Altering an individual's credit rating on the basis of the credit rating of the
spouse.
Id. at 17.
" Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974). The ECOA became Subchapter
IV of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691e (1976).
11 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 701(a), 88 Stat. 1521 (1974).
11 Such inquiries were allowed "if . . . for the purpose of ascertaining the creditor's
rights and remedies applicable to the particular extension of credit, and not to discriminate in a determination of creditworthiness." Id. § 701(b).
20
Id. § 703, 88 Stat. 1522.
21 The agencies and persons responsible for enforcing the Act and the type of credit
institutions each was to oversee were as follows: the Comptroller of the Currency (national
banks); the Federal Reserve Board (member banks of the Federal Reserve System other
than national banks); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (nonmember banks
insured by the FDIC); the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, acting directly or through the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (institutions subject to § 5(d) the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), § 407 of the National Housing Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1730 (1976), and§§ 6(i) & 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§
1426, 1437 (1976)); the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration (fed-
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civilly liable to an aggrieved applicant for any actual damages
sustained either by an individual acting alone or as a representative of a class 22 as well as for punitive damages, which are limited
to $10,000 in the case of an individual and to the lesser of $100,000
or one percent of the creditor's net worth in a class action. 23 Plaintiff applicants were also permitted to plead for injunctive reliefl~
and actions could be brought in any appropriate federal district
court within one year of the date of the occurrence of the violation, without regard to the amount in controversy. 25

B.

History of the Act: ECOA Amendments of 1976

The convoluted means by which the 1974 Act was passed28
caused many of the original provisions of legislation introduced
in the House of Representatives to be omitted. 27 Widespread disera! credit unions); the Interstate Commerce Commission (any common carrier subject
to "the Acts to regulate commerce"); the Civil Aeronautics Board (any air carrier subject
to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976)); the Secretary of Agriculture
(any creditor subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 181 (1976));
the Farm Credit Administration (any federal land bank, federal land bank association,
or production credit association); the Securities and Exchange Commission (brokers and
dealers); the Small Business Administration (small business investment companies); and
the Federal Trade Commission (enforcement not specifically committed by the ECOA to
some other government agency, regardless of whether the violator "is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act," 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976)). Id. § 704, 88 Stat. 1522. This division of enforcement authority
remained largely the same in the 1976 Act, with the FTC being given the power to enforce
Federal Reserve Board regulations promulgated under the ECOA as if they were FTC
regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c.
12
Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 706(a), 88 Stat. 1524 (1974).
12 Id. § 706(b), (c).
" Id. § 706(d).
,. Id. § 706(g).
n On July 23, 1973, the Senate passed S. 2101, which included amendments to the
Truth in Lending Act to prohibit discrimination in the granting of credit based on the
sex or marital status of the applicant. See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Because the House Committee on Banking and Currency had taken no action on that bill
nearly a year later, Senator Brock offered a nearly identical provision as ari amendment
to H.R. 11121, the Depository Institutions Amendments of 1974. 120 CoNG. REc. 19209
(1974). Approved by the Senate, the bill was sent to conference where it was reported out
favorably. H.R. REP. No. 1429, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in (1974] U.S. CooE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6148. A rule forbidding House members from objecting to Senate
amendments to H.R. 11121 was passed by the House over the strenuous objections of
Representative Sullivan, the principal sponsor of the original House equal credit bill, H.R.
14856, who argued that the credit discrimination provisions ofH.R. 11121 inserted by the.
Senate were too weak. 120 CONG. REc. 34759-60 (1974). The conference report, however,
was accepted by the House and Senate and the bill was signed into law by President Ford
on October 28, 1974. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503, 88 Stat. 1521 ·
(1974).
27
H.R. 14856 had included race, color, religion, national origin, and age together with
sex and marital status as prohibited bases of discrimination. 1974 Credit Discrimination
Hearings, supra note 15, at 3.
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satisfaction with the limited nature of the 1974 Act 28 led to the
introduction of numerous bills in the House and Senate to expand
coverage of the antidiscrimination provisions of the ECOA. 29 Evidence of discrimination against the elderly 30 and nonwhites 31
caused Congress to accept the recommendations of its Conference
Committee32 and pass the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976. 33
Substantive changes included the addition of age, race, color,
national origin, religion, receipt of public assistance benefits, and
the exercise of legal rights under the Consumer Credit Protection
Act as prohibited criteria in the credit-granting process. 34 The
new law requires creditors to notify "each applicant against
whom adverse action is taken" of the reasons for such adverse
action. 35 The administrative enforcement provisons were substanzs At hearings held in 1975, Representative Frank Annunzio claimed that the 1974 Act
had been accepted merely to get some form of equal credit legislation on the books, but
that "this time . . . [he was] not willing to settle for legislation that will allow for
discrimination in any way, shape, or form." Hearings on H.R. 3386 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings].
21
These bills included H.R. 3386, introduced by Representative Sullivan to cover age,
race,· and sex discrimination (later changed to H.R. 5616); S. 483, introduced by Senator
Brock to deal with age discrimination; and S. 1927, introduced by Senator Biden to
prevent discrimination based on race, color, religion, age, national origin, political affiliation, receipt of public assistance benefits, or the exercise of rights under the law. Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate
Hearings].
so The legislative consultant to the National Retired Teachers Association and the
American Association of Retired Persons presented evidence, consisting largely of letters
of complaint received by these organizations, tending to reveal what the consultant called
"a clear pattern of discrimination against older persons by certain national credit card
companies, department stores, gasoline companies, banks, and other credit-granting institutions." 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 73.
11
The Chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission presented evidence
revealing discrimination against minorities in the granting of mortgage and other credit.
1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 131-37, 293-99. But see NCCF
REP<>RT, supra note 13, at 160: "The Commission did not find sufficient evidence to prove
the hypothesis that there is racial discrimination in the granting of consumer credit."
12
S. REP. No. 685, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
,. Act of March 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976) (codified at 15 U .S.C.
§§ 1691-1691e (1976)) .
.. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976).
11
15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2) (1976). A creditor may satisfy this obligation either by notifying every applicant of the reasons involved in taking the adverse action or by informing
every applicant that he or she may request (within sixty days) a statement ofreasons from
the creditor. Id. "Adverse action" is defined by the statute as "a denial or revocation of
credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit
in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested." Not included in the
term is "a refusal to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where
the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default, or where such additional credit would
exceed a previously established credit limit." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (1976).
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tially expanded and the FTC was given the power to enforce
Federal Reserve Board regulations promulgated under the ECOA
"in the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of a
Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule." 38 Potential
civil liability against a creditor in a class action was expanded so
that punitive damages could not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or
one percent of the creditor's net worth. 37 Furthermore, the
amendments substituted a two-year limitation for a one-year limitation for bringing of an action under the ECOA. 38
The Attorney General was made a potential enforcer of the
ECOA by the amendments. If agencies which are responsible for
administrative enforcement are unable to obtain compliance by
their own actions, they are authorized to refer the matter to. the
Attorney General "with a recommendation that an appropriate
civil action be instituted. " 39 The Attorney General may also act
on his own if "he has reason to believe that one or more creditors
are engaged in a pattern or practice" in violation of the Act. 40 In
either case, he may bring a civil action in an appropriate federal
district court for "appropriate" (including injunctive) relief. 41
Finally, Congress expanded the reporting responsibilities of the
Federal Reserve Board from their statutorily mandated annual
report to Congress under the Truth in Lending Act 42 to one on the
ECOA as well. 43

C.

Congressional Intent: The Balancing of Creditor and Consumer Interests

1. The competing interests - As amended, the ECOA represents the conflicting interests inherent in the credit-granting process, interests which were made known throughout the Act's
formative stages. Ascertaining congressional intent involves examination of all the positions to see how they are meshed in
ECOA.
Although many laws at both the state 44 and federal 45 levels
11 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (1976). The FTC has begun stricter enforcement of the Board's
regulations within the past two years. See notes 176-81 and accompanying text infra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976). AP, of October 1979, no class actions involving ECOA had
reached the trial stage in the federal courts.
11 15 u.s.c. § 1691e(O (1976).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (1976).
'° 15 U.S.C. § 1691(h) (1976). For a discussion of recent Justice Department actions
under this portion of the statute, see notes 182-88 and accompanying text infra.
" Id.
u 15 u.s.c. § 1613 (1976).
" 15 u.s.c. § 1691f (1976).
" Every state has legislation that governs the amount of interest to be charged when
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arose during this century to govern the ever-expanding field of
consumer credit, 48 the decision as to whom credit should be
granted has traditionally been one for the creditor to make unhampered by government regulation. The "three C's of credit" the character, capacity, and capital of the applicant - have traditionally governed the creditor's decision, with differences in
sex, marital status, age, and race often playing important roles
in the process. 47 At the congressional hearings on the ECOA, representatives of the credit industry fervently argued that the Act
would destroy the freedom of choice necessary to make rational
credit-granting decisions, to the detriment of creditors and consumers alike. 48 Particularly troublesome was the Act's proscription of "discrimination" in the granting of credit. One writer in
an industry publication commented:
Regrettably, the word "discrimination" is susceptible of
two interpretations, one of which is intended to come
within the prohibition of the Act - the other being essential to the survival of the credit business. . . . Any grant
or denial of credit is by its very nature, discriminatory;
that is, in order to survive economically, every credit grantor must discriminate between those whom he believes
will pay their debts and those who will not. 49
Thus, what creditors feared is that the ECOA represented the
first step on the road toward "automatic" granting of credit to
the parties to a loan agreement fail to specify the rate of interest. Usury laws, effective in
nearly every state, specify the maximum legal rate of interest which may be charged.
States also generally have laws patterned after the Uniform Small Loan Act to govern
loans not exceeding a statutorily prescribed amount, as well as laws covering practives of
lending institutions licensed by the state. See generally B. CURRAN, TRENos IN CONSUMER
CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965).
" Federal credit laws include the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1772
(1976), the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1976), and the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1616 (1976). See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 44.
" The "evolution" of the cash-and-carry society of yesteryear into the credit-dominated
economy of today is demonstrated by figures available from the Federal Reserve Board.
At the end of 1939, the total amount of outstanding consumer credit (excluding real estate
mortgage credit) was $7.2 billion. By the end of 1956, it had grown to $42.3 billion and to
$69.9 billion by the end of 1963. 50 FED. REs. BULL. 376 (1964). At the end of 1977, that
figure had grown to a staggering $216.6 billion. 64 FED. RES. BULL. A42 (1978).
11 M. NEIFELD, NEIFELD's MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 501 (1961). Neifeld labels divorcees, Indians living on reservations, and those living in an "untidy home" or a "rundown
neighborhood" poor credit risks. Id. at 512.
48 See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 95-112 (statements
of Thomas A. Haeussler, President of Capital Financial Services, Inc., and Robert Norris,
General Counsel of the National Consumer Finance Association).
" Brown, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 1 CREDIT 4, 28 (1975). See also NCCF
REPORT, supra note 13, at 151-52.
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those who met certain government standards. 00
Equal rights advocates, on the other hand, fought strongly for
legislation to curtail the traditional freedom of creditors
''arbitrarily" to select those to whom credit would be granted.
The Chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission
went so far as to attack the idea of creditworthiness itself, saying
that use of the "purportedly neutral standard" operated "to preclude a disproportionate number of minorities who are less welleducated, occupy poorer-paying jobs, and hence have inferior
credit ratings or no credit record," and was therefore discriminatory. 51 Calling for creditors to make their decisions solely on the
basis of ability to repay, sponsors of the legislation defined age,
sex, and race as "extraneous factors of group identification"
which ought not to play any part in a creditor's decision. 52 One
witness went further and demanded a ban on all characteristics
which could be shown to be significantly related to any of the
prohibited criteria. 53 Under this view, for example, if home ownership could be shown to be closely correlated with sex, then creditors could no longer employ home ownership as a factor in the
granting of credit.
In examining the legislative history of the ECOA to ascertain
congressional intent in this area, it becomes clear that Congress
balanced the interests on each side in framing the legislation.
Representative Leonor Sullivan, perhaps the most zealous advocate of the ECOA, revealed the nature of this compromise when
she said:
[W]e recognize that while every person should have equal
opportunity to qualify for credit on the basis of his or her
creditworthiness, the business firm which extends credit
requires and deserves the right to refuse those who cannot
or will not fulfill the obligation of repayment, and to inquire into any circumstances in the applicant's situation
which would make it impossible for the creditor to apply
appropriate legal remedies in case of default. 54
Such a view was reflected in the congressional reports which ac11

Brown, supra note 49, et 28.
•• 1975 House Hearings, supra note 28, et 40 (statement of Arthur S. Flemming, Chairmen, United States Civil Rights Commission).
12
Statement of Representative Leonor Sullivan in the House of Representatives, Mey
16, 1974; reprinted in 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, et 15 .
.. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, et 36 (statement of Issie Jenkins,
Associate General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
"'Id. et 29.
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companied both the 1974 Act and the 1975 amendments. 55 Congress therefore wished to let the creditor retain the right to make
rational credit-granting decisions, but it defined "rational" to
exclude consideration of the characteristics listed in the Act as
prohibited criteria.
Allied with the concern that creditors not be so limited by the
provisions of the Act as to damage their ability to make reasonable credit-granting decisions was the question of the proper
means to determine whether "discrimination" had in fact occurred. The provisions of one of the original pieces of legislation
in this area, introduced in the House, defined the term as the
making of "any invidious discrimination," 56 while that of another
proposed bill defined it as the taking of "any arbitrary action
based on any characteristic attributable to the sex or marital
status of an applicant." 57 Concern was expressed by various witnesses at the problems likely to arise if discrimination was defined in the bill itself because it might unnecessarily limit or
expand liability. 58 Eventually the decision was made to omit a
definition from the Act itself. 59 The meaning of the term, however, is stated in the Senate report accompanying the 1974 Act:
"Discrimination in the extension of credit occurs when a credit
applicant is not evaluated pursuant to a creditor's ordinary credit
criteria, but is judged - and frequently denied credit - not
individually, but because of membership in a class." 60
2. Proof of discrimination under the ECOA - Proving that
one is the victim of illegal discrimination by a creditor under such
a definition is no simple task. To make it easier for an ECOA suit
to be brought, Congress specifically indicated that a test of discrimination created by the courts in the equal employment opportunity area was to be applied in ECOA ·suits as well. In a
report on the 1976 amendments to the Act, the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs clearly indicated that
.. See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1975); S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in (1976] U.S.
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 403, 405.
•• H.R. 14856, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(5) (1974).
57 H.R. 14908, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 702(0 (1974).
58 See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 72 (appendix to the
statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, Governor, Federal Reserve Board) .
., A unanimous vote of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee
on Banking and Currency decided to remove all adjectives before the word "discriminate,"
thereby letting the courts decide on a case-by-case basis which types of credit discrimination to permit. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 402. See generally
Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the "Effects" Test, 95 BANKING L.J. 241,
245-48 (1978).
'° S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1973).
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the so-called "effects test',' be used by the courts in the evaluation
of ECOA suits to determine whether discrimination was present. 81
As applied by the United States Supreme Court in such cases
as Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 82 and Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 83 this test states that any employment practice or procedure is prohibited if its use has a discriminatory impact upon a
group which the statute in question is designed to protect. 84 In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 65 the Court explained the relative burdens of proof in an employment discrimination case
brought under Title VII. The initial burden is on the plaintiff to
show that the practice used by the employer chooses applicants
in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the applicant pool. Such a showing represents a prima facie case of
discrimination, requiring a shift in the burden of proof to the
defendant, who must demonstrate that the practice has "a
manifest relationship to the employment in question." 88 If the
employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then attempt to
show that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' " 87
Such a showing by the plaintiff would demonstrate that the employer was using the challenged employment practice as a "pretext for discrimination. " 88
More recent cases, however, indicate that the Court may wish
to make the plaintiffs burden of proof more difficult. In General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 89 the Court ruled that a disability plan
which denied benefits to those with pregnancy-related disabilities
11

S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CooE CONG.

& Ao. NEWS 403, 406.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
" In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), for example, black employees of
the defendant brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1976), alleging that defendant's policy of requiring a high school diploma or the
passing of certain intelligence tests as a condition of employment or transfer to higherlevel jobs consituted illegal discrimination. The Court of Appeals found for the company
on the ground that the employees had failed to show that the adoption of the employment
policy was motivated by discriminatory intent. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225
(4th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII outlawed any employment practice (albeit neutral on its face) that had the effect of discrimination. In short,
discriminatory intent was held not to be an essen"tial element in plaintiffs' burden of proof
in Title VII cases. For an analysis of Griggs, see Blumrosen, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
Strangers in Paradise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
•• 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
n Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
" Id. at 425.
" Id. Accord, McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
12
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did not constitute a showing of sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII. 70 In a racial discrimination suit brought against an
employer as a violation of the equal protection component of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court ruled that
the Title VII requirement of a mere showing of discriminatory
impact was insufficient in constitutional cases: 71 "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. " 72
Despite this alteration in the burden of proof a plaintiff must
bear, the congressional intent that the effects test be applied in
ECOA cases remains. 73 The puzzle is to determine to what extent
a creditor may in effect discriminate against an applicant by
using either the prohibited criteria themselves or proxy criteria
so closely correlated with the prohibited criteria as to result in the
very discrimination which the ECOA was designed to prevent.
The language of the ECOA is somewhat confusing in this regard,
because age, marital status, and the receipt of income from a
public assistance program may all be taken into account, 74 although the Act prohibits their use to discriminate. 75 This lack of
clarity hinders analysis as to which criteria affect the receipt of
credit; the fact that applicants in one age group are being denied
credit more than those in another age group is not easily labelled
a violation of the Act. 76 Examination of Regulation B 77 provides
a clearer view of what creditors may and may not use in their
decisions whether to grant credit.
II.

REGULATION

B

Although representatives of the Federal Reserve Board argued
70
The Court reasoned: "[T]here is no risk from which men are protected and women
are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not." 429
U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)). Plaintiffs therefore
failed to make the requisite showing of gender-based effect. For criticism of this decision
and its reasoning, see Comment, General Electric Co. u. Gilbert: A Lesson in Sex Education and Discrimination - The Relationship Between Pregnancy and Gender and the
Vitality of Disproportionate Impact Analysis, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 119 (1977).
71
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72
Id. at 242.
73
See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (1976).
,. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976).
71
For example, the use of "any empirically derived credit system which considers age"
is permitted "if such system is demonstrably and statistically sound" and if "the age of
an elderly applicant [is not] assigned a negative factor or value . . . . " 15 U.S.C. §
1691(b)(3) (1976).
77
12 C.F.R. § 202 (1979).
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that the ECOA would be better enforced without the promulgation of regulations, 78 Congress chose the Board to create specific
rules to enforce the broad mandates of the Act. 79 Perhaps the best
way to become acquainted with the major provisions of Regulation B80 is to observe its impact upon a typical credit transaction.
To do so, we will follow Ms. X, a 35-year-old divorcee with two
children, as she enters a bank to obtain an installment loan.
Regulation B prohibits the bank from making "any oral or
written statement, . . . to applicants or prospective applicants
that would discourage on a prohibited basis 81 a reasonable person
from making or pursuing an application. " 82 It is in relation to the
1
• 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 231 (statement of Jeffrey M.
Bucher, Governor, Federal Reserve Board).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (1976). Following passage of the original Act in late 1974, the Board
began to work on a set of preliminary regulations, which it published in April 1975 in order
to allow the public an opportunity to comment upon them. 40 Fed. Reg. 18,183 (1975).
After hearings were held (n May, the Board published revised regulations in September.
40 Fed. Reg. 42,030 (1975). In response to pressure from business groups, the new regulations limited application of many parts of the Act (as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1691b
(1976)) to consumer credit. Exempted from various provisions of the Act (such as inquiries
as to marital status and the requiring of notice as to the main provisions of the ECOA)
were business, securities, public utility, and "incidental" credit. 40 Fed. Reg. 42,032
(1975). See also Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity -An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus.
LAw. 1641, 1644-45 (1976). Criticism of the Board's decision in this matter may be found
in Note, Equal Credit: Promise or Reality?, 11 HARV. C1v. RTS. - C1v. Lie. L. REV. 186,
202-03 (1976). The final rules, issued just six days before the Act took effect, reflected
further pressures placed on the Board by both consumer and creditor lobbyists. 40 Fed.
Reg. 49,298 (1975). See Fed Shifts Plan on Equal Credit, N.Y. Times, September 8, 1975,
at 43, col. 5; Federal Reserve Officials Tell Women They Will Revise Rules on Credit Bias,
N.Y. Times, September 19, 1975, at 30, col. 1. The final regulations included such proconsumer provisions as requiring creditors to provide each applicant with a summary of
the main provisions of the ECOA, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,299-300 (1975), and the forbidding of
the "discouragement" of applicants on a prohibited basis, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,299 (1975), as
well as such pro-creditor provisions as further expansion of the aforementioned exemptions for non-consumer credit. 40 Fed. Reg. 49,305 (1975).
Following passage of the ECOA Amendments of 1976, much the same procedure was
followed in order to amend the regulations. Proposed changes were published in July 1976,
41 Fed. Reg. 29,870 (1976), hearings were held in August, and a revised set of regulations
were published in November. 41 Fed. Reg. 49,123 (1~76). Changes included amendment
of the ECOA notice requirement so that only rejected applicants need be given the notice.
41 Fed. Reg. 49,129 (1976). Finally, in early 1977, the current regulations were published,
to take effect with the ECOA amendments on March 23, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242 (1977).
80
For an exhaustive examination of the provisions of the current version of Regulation
B, see Ziino, A Review of the Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 1
(1977).
•• Prohibited basis means race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, or age (provided that the applicant has the capacity to enter into a binding
contract); the fact that all or part of the applicant's income derives from any
public assistance program, or the fact that the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act or any State law upon
which an exemption has been granted by the Board.
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(z) (1979).
•• 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1979).
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information which may be requested in the application itself,
however, that the regulations have their greatest effect. The general rule is that " [e ]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,
a creditor may request any information in connection with an
application, " 83 yet the regulations list several exceptions to this
general rule "so as to prohibit the requesting of information of
which the sole utility would be to assist in discrimination." 84
The bank may not request that Ms. X inform it of her sex, 85
race, color, religion, national origin, 88 birth control practices, or
child-bearing intentions or capability. 87 If Ms. X applies for individual, unsecured credit, the bank may not ask her marital status
unless she resides in a community property state or property upon
which she is relying to repay the loan is located in such a state. 88
Otherwise, the bank may legally ask her only to indicate whether
she is married, unmarried, or separated. 89 Information regarding
Ms. X's ex-husband may be obtained only if she is relying on
alimony, child support, or separate maintenance payments from
him as a basis for repaying the loan. 90 The bank's application
must inform Ms. X that income from these sources need not be
disclosed if she does not want it included when the bank determines her creditworthiness. 91
In evaluating the application of Ms. X, the bank is governed
by Regulation B's general rule that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the Act and this Part [of the Code of Federal Regulations], . . . any information [may be used] that the creditor
obtains, so long as the information is not used to discriminate
against an applicant on a prohibited basis." 92 The significance of
this provision is explained by the Board's comments to Regulation B, which state that the words "to discriminate" are to be
read in light of congressional intent that the effects test93 be used
to measure discrimination in the credit-granting process. 94 To
confirm this interpretation, the Board included a footnote follow12 C.F.R. § 202.5(h)(l) (1979).
Ziino, supra note 80, at 10-11.
83
12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(3) (1979).
,. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (1979).
87
•
12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(4) (1979).
88
12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(l) (1979).
81
The "unmarried" category "includes single, divorced, and widowed individuals." Id.
90 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(2)(v) (1979). In general, information regarding a spouse may not
be requested unless the spouse uses the account or is contractually liable upon it. For other
specific exemptions, see 12 C.F.R. 202.5(c)(2) (1979).
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(2) (1979).
• 2 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) (1979).
" See text accompanying notes 61-72 supra.
" 42 Fed. Reg. 1246 (1977).
83

84
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ing the provision discussing the effects test and citing the legislative history supporting its use under the ECOA. 95 The Board concluded, however, that the effects test was not well-suited for regulatory implementation. 98 Congressional intent regarding the test
was thus implemented solely by the provision quoted above and
its accompanying footnote.
In contrast to this general proscription against discrimination,
the regulations weave a complex pattern of permission and prohibition with regard to the use of age, marital status, and income
from a public assistance program. Neither Ms. X's age nor any
money that she may, for example, receive from welfare may be
taken into account in evaluating her application, 97 with two exceptions. If the bank has a "demonstrably and statistically
sound, empirically derived credit system, " 98 it may use her age as
a predictive variable in assessing creditworthiness. 99 If it instead
has a "judgmental system of evaluating creditworthiness,"ioo it
may consider her age or welfare payments "only for the purpose
of determining a pertinent element of creditworthiness."io 1 Further provisions covering the evaluation of Ms. X's application
prohibit the bank from (1) using statistics on her likelihood of
bearing children to predict future diminished income, 102 (2) taking into account the existence of a telephone listing in Ms. X's
name, 103 and (3) discounting or excluding from consideration the
income of Ms. X due to a prohibited basis 104 or because the income is derived from part-time employment. io5 The bank may
consider the likelihood that alimony, child support, or separate
maintenance payments will be consistently received using specified guidelines, and to the extent that it determines them to be
consistent, must count them as income if Ms. X so desires. we
12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) n.7 (1979).
" 42 Fed. Reg. 1246 (1977).
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(i) (1979).
" Such a system is defined as one: (1) in which the data used to develop the sytem are
either the complete population or a statistically appropriate sample thereof, (2) which is
designed to predict the creditworthiness of applicants with respect to "legitimate business
interests of the creditor," (3) which separates good and poor credit risks "at a statistically
significant rate," and (4) which is periodicaly reassessed as to its predictive ability using
proper statistical methods, with appropriate adjustments. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2) (1979).
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(ii) (1979).
100 Such a system is defined as any evaluation system "other than a demonstrably and
statistically sound, empirically derived credit system." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(t) (1979).
IOI 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(iii) (1979).
102
12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(3) (1979).
103 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(4) (1979).
1
°' See note 81 supra.
105
12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1979).
IOI Id.
e&
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After evaluating Ms. X's application, the bank is bound by
Regulation B not to refuse to grant her credit, assuming she is
creditworthy, on any prohibited basis.' 07 Several provisions of the
regulations dealing with the establishment of accounts in Ms. X's
own name (as opposed to that of her ex-husband) help to fulfill
one of the purposes of the ECOA, which is to permit a woman to
open an account and create her own credit history .108
The other major portion of the regulations likely to affect Ms.
X is the section requiring the bank to provide notification of the
action it takes regarding her application for credit. 109 With respect
to a "completed" application, 110 the bank must notify Ms. X of
its decision within thirty days after receipt of the "completed"
application. 111 If "adverse action" 112 is taken regarding an uncompleted application or an existing account, Ms. X must also be
notified within thirty days. 113 Such a notification (for any of the
actions listed above) must include all of the following:
A statement of the action taken,
a statement of the basic provisions of ECOA, 114
(3) the name and address of the relevant federal agency
that administers compliance concerning the creditor providing the notification, and
(4) either:
(a) a statement of the specific reasons for the
action taken, 115 or
(b) a disclosure of the applicant's right to receive
such a statement of reasons. 116
(1)

(2)

Despite the length of Regulation B, creditors and applicants
alike may be left unsure as to what may be legally asked of an
applicant and which acts by a creditor constitute discrimination.
Although the regulations reflect congressional intent that the ef12 C.F.R. § 202.7(a) (1979).
12 C.F.R. § 202.7(b)-.7(d) (1979).
lot 12 C.F.R. § 202.9 (1979).
11
• An application is deemed "completed" only if the creditor "has received all the
information that the creditor regularly obtains and considers in evaluating applications
for the amount and type of credit requested . . . provided, however, that the creditor has
exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining such information." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(0 (1979).
111
12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(l)(i) (1979).
112
"Adverse action" is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c), following the definition included
in the statute at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (1976). See note 35 supra.
"' 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(l)(ii, iii) (1979).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976). The regulations provide an acceptable statement which
creditors may use to satisfy this requirement. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(l) (1979).
111
The regulations provide a sample form. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1979).
111 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2) (1979).
107

108
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fects test be applied, they do little to implement the test in any
concrete fashion. 117 This is striking in light of the generally accepted conclusion that the ECOA represents at least as much as
a piece of civil rights legislation as a bill to regulate financial
institutions. 118 An examination of the characteristics of those denied credit and those who perceive such denial as discriminatory
serves to illuminate the criteria that play an important role in the
credit-granting process, whether they are formally legal or illegal
according to the ECOA and regulations. An examination of the
everyday operation of the credit-granting process may demonstrate which credit-granting criteria operate to deny credit to
those for whom the ECOA signalled the end of discrimination.

Ill. EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECOA: REASONS FOR USING
· A SURVEY

Several methods are available to examine the effectiveness of
the ECOA and Regulation B. Most common would be an appraisal of lawsuits brought under the Act. This would permit a
study of the common types of fact situations which lead to litigation as well as those provisions of the ECOA and Regulation B
which give the courts special problems of interpretation. There
are two problems with this approach, however, one practical and
one theoretical. First, there are only four reported cases involving
the ECOA, 119 making it all but impossible to draw any sort of
117
One witness who testified before the Board at hearings on the amended regulations
noted:
The proposal . . . makes no reference to any of the criteria currently in use which
are directly discriminatory on the basis of race - such as prior home ownership,
minumum educational requirements, length of residence in the community - all
of which are commonly used by mortgage lenders. . . .IT the Board feels that it
has insufficient data concerning the relationship of these criteria to creditworthiness to justify an outright prohibition, there are other approaches to the problem short of leaving lending institutions and . . . applicants totally without guidance.
Statement of Roger S. Kuhn, Center for National Policy Review, Catholic University
School of Law, Dkt. No. R-0013 (August 12, 1976), quoted in Baer, supra note 59, at 253-

254.
118

Baer, supra note 59, at 255.
National State Bank v. Long, 469 F. Supp. 1068 (D.N.J. 1979) (dictum) (the ECOA
does not preempt state anti-redlining law since it does not specifically include geographic
location in its list of prohibited credit-granting criteria); Shuman v. Standard Oil Co. of
California, 453 F.Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (alleged wrongful denial of credit card
permits actual damages under the ECOA - including compensation for embarassment,
humiliation, mental distress, and harm to one's reputation caused by the denial - and
punitive damages arising from a "reckless disregard" of the requirements of the law);
Smith v. Lakeside Foods, 449 F.Supp. 171 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (credit application containing
neither designation that indication of applicant's title - Mr., Miss, Mrs., or Ms. - is
optional nor conspicuous notice of the ECOA required by Regulation B violates the Act
111

118
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generalization. Second, even if there were a larger number of
lawsuits, the problem would still remain of limiting analysis to
only those situations deemed serious enough to require a lawyer
and subsequent litigation. This would doubtlessly exclude a large
number of credit problems with which the ECOA was designed
to deal. 120
Examination of consumer complaints filed with state and federal agencies, 121 consumer groups, or the Better Business Bureau
in order to discover whether reports of illegal discrimination were
frequent represents another method of assessing how well the
legislation is working. Again, two problems arise. First, it is
doubtful whether such complaints would be open to public
inspection under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 122 That
Act "does not apply to matters that are . . . contained in or
related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions." 123 Even assuming that records of such complaints were available, analysis
would again be limited to those situations which consumers
bothered to report, thereby biasing the results. Numerous
studies of consumer complaint behavior demonstrate that the
"complainer" is not an average type of person. 124
A third avenue is to examine creditor records in order to assess
even though applicant sustained no actual damages); Carroll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434
F.Supp. 557 (D.C. La. 1977) (defendant held to have violated the ECOA due to its failure
to notify plaintiff of reasons it denied her a credit card). Unreported slip opinions involving
the ECOA include: Vander Missen v. Kellogg-Citizens National Bank of Green Bay, No.
78-C-671 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 10, 1979) (plaintiff had Seventh Amendment right to jury trial
under the ECOA); Harbaugh v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, No. 77-C-1985 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 1978) (permissible under the ECOA for creditor
not to affix courtesy title to applicant's credit card); O'Quinn v. Diners Club, No. 77-C3491 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1978) (notification of decision to deny plaintiff credit card failed
to provide adequate specificity concerning the reasons for the denial where notification
only stated that applicant "does not qualify"). Note should also be taken of what is
apparently the first ECOA case to reach the federal courts of appeal. In Markham v.
Colonial Mortgage Service Co., No. 78-1616 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 1979), 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) , 97,671 (1979), the court held that the ECOA prevents creditors from refusing to
aggregate the incomes of two unmarried applicants who are living together where the
incomes of two similarly situated married applicants would have been aggregated.
120 See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE Pueuc (1977) for an empirical study of who
goes to lawyers, for what, and when.
121 Federal agencies worth examining would be those listed in the Act (15 U.S.C. §
1691c(a) (1976)). See note 21 supra.
122 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1976).
113 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976).
"' See, e.g., Liefeld, Edgecombe & Wolfe, Demographic Characteristics of Canadian
Consumer Complaints, 9 J. CONSUMER AFF. 73 (1975); Warland, Herrmann & Willits,
Dissatisfied Consumers: Who Gets Upset and Who Takes What Action, 9 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 148 (1975).
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compliance with the Act and the regulations. Although Regulation B requires that monitoring information be submitted by
creditors to the Federal Reserve Board to allow the Board to
check compliance with the ECOA, 125 the FOIA exemption mentioned above 128 would certainly preclude private researchers from
obtaining access to such records. Further problems, which even
the Board encounters, include the enormous amount of time and
money necessary to do even an adequate job of monitoring compliance as well as the possibility that such records are biased in
favor of creditors.
Another choice, the one to be employed in this article, involves
a random sampling of consumers to ascertain their perceptions of
possible discrimination in the credit-granting process. While this
involves relying upon non-lawyers to report on what are often
legal questions, and raises traditional survey problems 127 such as
sampling error, 128 the advantages of such a "grass roots" approach
far outweigh these potential disadvantages. This method allows
for the discovery of problems which are ordinarily never brought
to the attention of a lawyer or bureaucrat and also provides some
hard data with which to support recommendations for law reform.129 Furthermore, the approach stresses how intended beneficiaries of the Act feel; it is these feelings of perceived discrimination that may well result in potential litigation under the ECOA.

IV.

SURVEY BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY, AND STATISTICAL
MODEL EMPLOYED

A.

Background

The survey discussed here was sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board 130 to examine various facets of the consumer credit
area. 131 A nationwide representative sample of 2563 Americans
120
12 C.F.R. § 202.13 (1979). Such information is used to some extent in preparing the
Board's annual reports to Congress on how well the ECOA is working. See, e.g., BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE YEAR 1977, at 2-3 (1978).
"' See note 123 accompanying text supra.
127
See text accompanying notes 135-45 infra.
iu See text accompanying notes 143-45 infra.
121
The need for such hard data was noted in Hays, A Suggested Analysis for Regulation
of Equal Credit Opportunity, 52 WASH. L. REv. 335, 366 (1977).
1
"' The survey was jointly funded by the Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
"' Areas of inquiry covered by the survey include: attitudes toward the use of credit;
knowledge of interest rates and finance charges on recent loans; attitudes toward and
experience with credit cards (including credit card billing errors); and a large amount of
information on housing, major additions and repairs, vehicles, durable purchases, and

120

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:1

was interviewed in August-September of 1977 by the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan. 132 One section
of the questionnaire was specifically designed to elicit responses
relevant to the operation of the ECOA. 133

B.

Questions Chosen for Inclusion m the Model

Since the purpose of the article is to assess the effectiveness of
the ECOA and Regulation B, the questions chosen are those believed to be the best for locating the presence of adverse credit
actions of a potentially discriminatory nature. Any predictive
model involves two types of variables: those which measure the
phenomenon which the model attempts to explain, called
dependent variables, and those used to predict or explain the
phenomenon under investigation, called independent variables.
recreation and hobby items - information such as the number owned, purchased, and
how each was paid for. In addition, the survey questioned respondents on their holdings
of assets, including savings and checking accounts, certificates of deposit, real estate
holdings, and stocks and bonds. Finally, the survey attempted to discover the processes
used by consumers in shopping for both products and credit. A summary of the survey
results is presented in T. DURKIN & G. ELLIEHAUSEN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY (1978),
published by the Federal Reserve Board. More detailed information on the survey may
be obtained by writing to the Economic Behavior Program, Survey Research Center,
University of Michigan, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. A copy is on file with the
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM.
"' The Survey Research Center's (SRC) national sample of dwellings is a multi-stage
probability sample with units at different stages selected with probabilities proportional
to 1970 population and housing unit counts. The sample design contains five stages of
selection, with the overall probability of selection for any particular housing unit in the
nation being the sum of all of the probability of selections at any particular stage in the
process.
The sampling fraction for this survey was developed from the data contained in the
following equation:
Co-operating number of households
(Estimated total no. of households in U.S.) X (coverage rate)
X (response rate)
2563

1

(74,100,000) X (.95) X (.74)

20,317

In other words, if the SRC sampling procedure covers 95 percent of all American households, each respondent represents approximately 20,000 similar households.
Further information on the sampling methods used in this and other SRC surveys may
be found in SURVEYS OF CONSUMERS, 1974-1975, at 221-23 (R. Curtin ed. 1976).
133 Questions relating to the ECOA were of four types: those probing "unfair treatment"
the respondents had experienced in credit transactions, those asking respondents to tell
of complaints they had made to someone other than a relative or a friend about unfavorable credit experiences, those asking for the respondent's knowledge of and attitude toward
a dozen credit-granting criteria (both legal and illegal), and those used in this article,
which deal with credit refusals and the perceived reasons therefor.
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In this analysis, the responses to two survey questions were selected as dependent variables to measure the effectiveness of the
ECOA and Regulation B: the presence of credit refusals or limitations within the past few years, and the perception that such
refusals or limitations were due to the respondent's race, sex, age,
or national origin.
Since this analysis is designed to discover which characteristics
of credit applicants are associated with credit refusals and perceived discrimination, a large number of factors used by creditors
in deciding whether to grant credit 134 were examined as independent, or explanatory, variables. These were of two types: those
prohibited by the ECOA and Regulation B and those not prohibited. Included in the first group were age, race, sex and marital
status. Included in the second group were total family income,
total amount of outstanding installment debt, home ownership,
whether anyone in the family was employed, whether anyone in
the family had a checking account, length of time at present
address, and family size. The model thus attempts to weigh the
relative influence of some illegal credit-granting criteria against
some legal criteria to discover (1) whether there are significant
differences between various types of respondents in the incidence
of adverse credit decisions based on respondent characteristics
prohibited by the ECOA, (2) whether those differences persist
after adjustment for characteristics that creditors may legally
employ, (3) whether individuals involved in an adverse credit
decision felt they were discriminated against on a prohibited
basis, and (4) whether the results from (3) reveal a
"discrimination-perception-prone" type of individual.

C.

Problems with the Model

There are four potential problem areas in the use of the current
model.
1. Accuracy of the responses - Use of survey results assumes
some degree of faith in the truthfulness of the respondents questioned. In this survey, for example, it is assumed that reports of
credit refusals or limitations correctly represent actual incidents.
It is also assumed that respondents accurately report their age,
income, family size, and other objective factors. While there may
be some doubts as to the accuracy of such reports, 135 survey re'" See M. NEIFELD, supra note 47, at 505-15.
,:so As one author states,
This concern is evoked by the uneasy feeling that the respondent may, for a
variety of reasons, engage in a 'presentation of selr that is a subtle mixture of fact

122

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:1

searchers have generally concluded that use of such data is reliable.'38
2. Limitations on the dependent variables - The first dependent variable listed above, self-reported incidence of credit refusals or limitations, is intended to represent the concept of "adverse
action" mentioned in the Act 137 and Regulation B. 138 The way in
which the question is phrased in the survey, 139 however, does not
meet all of the legal requirements laid out in the regulations for
inclusion in the category of "adverse actions." 140 The essential
reason for this discrepancy is that framing the question relating
to this dependent variable so as to meet all of the regulatory
requirements would have hopelessly complicated the question,
thereby making the results of little empirical value. The question
ultimately used 141 attempts to balance comprehensibility to the
respondent with the legal standards by which "adverse action"
is defined.
3. Limitations on the independent variables - The basic
problem with use of the independent variables (those used to
predict credit refusals or limitations and perceptions of discrimination) is the impossibility of including other predictors which
may have important correlations with the independent variables
used. For example, analysis of the effects of age on credit refusal
may well reveal what appears to be widespread discrimination
against young applicants which may not be accounted for by
differences in income. The overriding factor here, of course, is the
applicant's credit history, which the survey does not measure
directly. Great care should thus be taken in assessing the effects
of any one independent variable used in the current model because a number of potentially important predictors, such as a
detailed credit history and the length of time at one's job, could
not be included in this analysis as independent variables. 142
and fiction. The validity of the survey findings is expected to vary with the
sensitivity of the topic to which the study is addressed. Accordingly, the greatest
skepticism will attend the reported results of surveys·designed to elicit information on matters of sex, religion, politics, and income. These fall under the rubric
of "one's own personal business."
Claussen, Response Validity: Vote Report, 32 Pue. OP. Q. 558, 558 (1968-1969).
1311 See Claussen, supra note 135; Parry & Crossley, Validity of Responses to Survey
Questions, 14 Pue. OP. Q. 61 (1950).
137 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2) (1976). See note 35 supra.
1., 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1979).
131 The question was: "Have you ever been turned down for credit [or] unable to get
as much credit as you wanted from a particular lender or creditor in the past.few years?"
0
"
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1979).
1
"
See note 139 supra.
"' Although no detailed credit history was used as an independent variable, its effect
may be partially represented by the total amount of outstanding installment debt in-
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4. Sampling error - Although SRC scientifically selects a
sample of the popultaion so that it reflects population characteristics as accurately as possible, 143 the very process of choosing a
limited number of households to represent the entire population
necessarily involves what is called sampling error.1" Sampling
error represents the difference between the actual population
value 145 as to a particular measured response and the result found
using only a sampling of the population. Such error in a survey
of this size is represented in Table 1, where the chances are 95 in
100 that the population value being estimated by the sampling
actually falls within the listed range on the table. The degree of
error depends upon the sample percentage, as the presence of the
various rows in Table 1 indicates. For example, Table 2 reveals
that 35% of those who had lived at their present address two years
or less reported credit refusals or limitations. According to Table
1, the actual population value for this subgroup lies somewhere
between about 32.5% and 37.5% - using an interpolation of the
"30 or 70" and the "50" percentage rows in the table.
TABLE 1

APPROXIMATE SAMPLING ERROR FOR SAMPLE SIZE OF 2300
Percentages reported

Sampling error (in percentage points)

50

± 2.65

30 or 70

± 2.40

20 or 80

± 2.10

10 or 90

± 1.60

5 or 95

± 1.15

Adapted from SURVEYS OF CONSUMERS, 1974-1975, at 229 (R. Curtin ed. 1976)

eluded in the model. Similarly, the length of time at one's current address may serve as a
partial indicator of the length of time at one's current job.
"' See note 132 supra.
'" For a fuller description of this statistical concept, see T. WoNNACO'IT & R. WoNNACO'IT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 300-01 (1969).
- '" "Actual population value" refers to the number that would be found if the survey
covered every household in the population.
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TABLE 2
MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF
REPORTED CREDIT REFUSALS OR LIMITATIONS
Proportion of Respondents Who
Reported Credit Refusal or
Limitation Within Past Few Years
Reported
Proportion

MCA Adjusted
Proportion

2286

.20

.20

263
505
345
388
344
434

.43
.32
.19
.18
.06
.04

.34
.28
.20
.20
.10
.09

1987
293

.18
.30

.19
.26

1555
246
276
205

.19
.31
.07
.31

.19
.25
.20
.21

1569
717

.20
.19

.20
.18

695
712
579

.25
.22
.16

.25
.19
.16

Total Outstanding Installment Debt
$0
1292
$1-499
168
$500-999
144
$1,000-1,999
187
$2,000 and over
495

.13
.38
.24
.22
.29

.16
.30
.20
.18
.27

Anyone in Family Employed?
Yes
No

1641
645

.23
.11

.19
.21

1589
696

.15
.31

.18
.23

Length of Time at Present Address
0-2 years
779
3-5 years
293
6-10 years
370
11-20 years
394
21 years or more
450

.35
.20
.14
.07
.09

.26
.17
.15
.13
.20

All Re1m2ngents
.A&:!:
18-25 years
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-64
65 and older

Bru:!:.
White
Nonwhite

Madtill Status
Married
Divorced/separated
Widowed
Never married
~

Male
Female
Total Family Income
Less than $10,000
$10,000-19,999
$20,000 and over

Own
Yes
No

Home?
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TABLE 2 (cont'd)
Proportion of Respondents Who
Reported Credit Refusal or
Limitation Within Past Few Years

liBYS: B

Reported
Proportiop

MCA Adjusted
Proportion

1873
392

.19
.24

.20
.17

466
724
752
316
28

.18
.15
.24
.23
.32

.18
.18
.21
.22
.29

Cb~s:kin&: As:s:1u.1nt1

Yes
No
F11mily Size
1
2
3-4
5-7
8 or more

TABLE 3
MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF
PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION IN CREDIT REFUSALS

Proportion of Respondents Who
Reported Belief that Credit was
Refused/Limited Due to Illegal
Criteria (age, sex, race/national

origjn ro11r, sratus}

All R~sn2nd~nt§

Reported
Proportion

MCA Adjusted
Proportion

431

.33

.33

109
161
59
66
19

.49
.28
.15
.26
.42
.53

.45
.35
.21
.20
.32
.20

355
75

.33
.33

.33
.35

277
73
19
62

.20
.49
.74
.58

.27
.40
.62
.43

303
128

.23
.56

.28
.45

168
148
89

.46
.28
.18

.35
.32
.34

~

18-25 years
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-64
65 and older
~

White
Nonwhite

lrlBrl@l Stat1111
Married
Divorced/separated
Widowed
Never married

&x
Male
Female

IotBl

F11milv lns:om~
Less than $10,000
$10,000-19,999
$20,000 and over
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TABLE 3 (cont'd)
Proportion of Respondents Who
Reported Belief that Credit was
Refused/Limited Due to Illegal
Criteria (age, sex, race/national
~

111:ildn, mai:
Reported
Proportion

Total Outstanding
Installment Debt
None
$1-499
$500-999
$1,000-1,999
$2,000 or over

stat1,111)

MCA Adjusted
Proportion

159
59
35
41
137

.40
.31
.31
.27
.28

.31
.29
.33
.30
.37

360
71

.30
.48

.31
.41

Yes
No

219
211

.24
.43

.30
.36

Length of Time at
Prgsi:nt Address
0-2 years
3-5 years
6-10 years
11-20 years
21 years or more

265
55
45
27
39

.37
.16
.16
.26
.54

.32
.24
.26
.41
.53

Yes
No

340
89

.30
.44

.32
.36

[11,mil:r l;!ize
1
2
3-4
5-7
8 or more

83
103
173
64
8

.55
.40
.24
.17
.25

.37
.41
.28
.28
.35

An:rone in Famil:r Eml!lo:reg?
Yes
No

Q:w:n H2m1: 1

HBl'.!:

Iii

Chi:s:kin&: A.1:1:21,mt?
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION
ANALYSES IN TABLES 2 AND 3 a

Credit Refusals
or Limitations
(!leta}

Perceived
Discrimination
(beta}

Age

.219
(1)

.216
(1)

Race

.062
(7)

.029
(11)

Marital status

.051
(8)

.193
(2)

Sex

.023
(11)

.172
(3)

Total family income

.095
(5)

.068

Total outstanding installment debt

.128
(3)

.066
(8)

Family employment

.026
(10)

.074
(6)

Home ownership

.075
(6)

.085
(5)

Time at present address

.157
(2)

.125
(4)

Have checking account

.049
(9)

.033
(10)

Family size

.118
(4)

.053
(9)

.167
(.155)
2286

.257
(.197)
431

Predict.ors

Multiple R-SQRD
(Adjusted)
Cases
a

(7)

Numbers in parentheses indicate the rank order of the beta statistics.

V.

A.

SURVEY RESULTS

Explanation of the Statistical Analysis

The results are presented in Tables 2 through 4. Tables 2 and
· 3 present the proportions of respondents reporting credit refusals
or limitations in Table 2 and of respondents perceiving discrimination in such adverse action in Table 3 in one column and
"Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) Adjusted Proportions"
(to be explained infra) in the other. For example, looking at the
"Reported Proportion" column in Table 2, we see that of the 263
respondents aged 18 to 25, 43% reported one or more credit refus-
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als or limitations within the past few years. This contrasts with
only 4% of those respondents aged 65 or older. Looking again at
Table 2, we see that of those respondents who owned their own
home, only 15% reported unfavorable credit decisions, while 31 %
of non-home owners reported such problems. Overall, as the top
row·in Table 2 indicates, 20% of the 2286 respondents 146 told interviewers that they had been denied credit or unable to obtain the
desired amount within the past few years.
The "MCA Adjusted Proportion" 147 column in Tables 2 and 3
gives an estimate of what the reported proportion would have
been had the subgroup in that row been exactly like the total
population with respect to all other predictor variables. For example, in Table 2, the 34% MCA adjusted proportion for those
aged 18 to 25 represents the 43% reported proportion adjusted for
the effect of all the other independent variables listed along the
left side of the table. The effect of such adjustment is dramatically demonstrated by examining the reported and MCA adjusted proportions for the independent variable "Total family
income" in Table 3. Simply by looking at the reported proportions, it would seem that income has an enormous impact upon
perceived discrimination, with those of low income much more
likely to report that their credit refusal was due to an illegal
criterion than those of higher income. As the numbers in the
MCA column indicate, however, this is not due to income, for
these differences all but disappear when adjustment is made for
age, education, race, sex, and other factors associated with income that are included among the independent variables.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for each of the dependent
variables. The beta statistic represents the net relationship be~
tween the independent and dependent variables after adjustment
is made for the influence of all of the other independent (predictor) variables. 148 More useful than examination of the actual beta
values themselves is their ranking, which is indicated by the
numbers in parentheses under each value. In predicting the incid'" The difference between the 2563 respondents who were surveyed and the 2286 respondents labelled "all respondents" in Table 2 is due to 277 respondents who were eliminated
from analysis for any of a number of reasons, such as failing to answer a question or
replying "don't know" to a question.
'" For a complete description of Multiple Classification Analysis and its uses, see F.
ANDREWS, J. MORGAN, J. SONQUIST & L. KLEM, MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS: A REPORT ON A COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR MULTIPLE REGRESSION USING CATEGORICAL PREDICTORS
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDREWS]. For an adaption of the MCA program
compatible with many computers, see INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN, OSIRIS ill, VOLUME I: SYSTEM_ AND PROGRAM DESIGN 575-87 (1973).
'" For a more complete description of the beta statistic, see ANDREWS, supra note 147,
at 47-49.
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ence of credit refusals or limitations us1ng the eleven explanatory
variables listed, Table 4 reveals that age is ranked as the best
predictor, with time at present address second and total amount
of debt third. The three best predictors of perceived discrimination are, in order, age, marital status, and sex.
The numbers in Table 4 labelled "Multiple R-SQRD" represent the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by variations in the predictor variables. 149 Thus, using all
eleven predictors together explains approximately 17% of the variance in adverse credit actions and approximately 26% of the
variance in perceived discrimination. The rest of the variance,
which cannot be explained by the combined use of these predictors, is due to other factors not included in the analysis and to
error. 150

B.

What the Tables Reveal

1. Credit refusals and limitations - As indicated by both
Tables 2 and 4, age plays the most important role in predicting
what type of person is most likely to report being refused credit
or being limited in the amount granted. As reported earlier, 43%
of those aged 18 to 25 report such refusals, but the percentage
decreases as the age of the respondent increases, to a low of only
4% of those aged 65 or older (Table 2): Even after adjustment is
made for the influence of factors such as income, home ownership, and length of time at present address, the age effect persists,
as the beta ranking in Table 4 confirms. As regards the other
illegal criteria, Table 2 reveals a troublesome difference between
the reported refusal rate for whites and nonwhites, even after
adjustment is made for relevant legal factors such as employment
and income. Little difference, however, may be attributed to marital status or sex, which rank eighth and eleventh, respectively,
out of the eleven predictors.
Of those factors that creditors may legally employ in deciding
whether to grant credit, the time that the respondent had lived
at his or her present address was the best predictor of reported
refusals (Table 4). Generally, the longer the time at one address,
'" For a general discussion on the nature of this statistic and what it helps to explain,
see E. BABBIE, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 307-09 (1973); T. WoNNACOTI & R. WoNNACOTI,
supra note 144, at 1-6.
150
The numbers in parentheses immediately under the "Multiple R-SQRD" numbers
are the squared multiple correlation coefficients adjusted for degrees of freedom and
represent the percentage of variance explained by the predictor variables aggregated after
corrections for capitalization or chance in fitting the model to the particular sample being
analyzed. ANDREWS, supra note 147, at 27-28.
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the _less likely a respondent was to report being denied credit
(Table 2). The total amount of outstanding installment debt
ranked next among the legal criteria, with a somewhat confusing
pattern to be found in Table 2. Adjustment for all predictors
relegated the other legal criteria to relatively unimportant predictive status (Table 4).
2. Perceived discrimination - Age is the most important predictor overall of perceived discrimination (Table 4). Young people
were more than twice as likely as the elderly to report believing
that the credit they desired and could not obtain was withheld
due to some illegal factor (Table 3). Marital status and sex
ranked second and third in terms of their predictive ability
(Table 4), with non-married respondents and women much more
likely to report that their personal characteristics were responsible for their credit denials (Table 3). Race had a relatively insignificant impact on the perception of discrimination (Table 4), as
reflected by the fact that 33% of both the white and nonwhite
subsamples reported such a perception (Table 3). All of the other
independent variables show little influence, excepting for the
higher incidence of perceived discrimination among those who
had lived at one address for a long time (Table 3). 151
3. Summary of results - Several things stand out among the
results. First, the young clearly report being turned down for
credit more often than older respondents and they are more likely
than their elders to view such action as arising from a discriminatory cause. Only 20% of the respondents, on average, indicated
that they had been refused credit within the past few years, while
34% (after adjustment) of those aged 18 to 25 so replied. One third
of those refused credit indicated that they thought age, sex, race,
national origin, or marital status was involved in the creditor's
decision to deny them credit, while 45% of the youngest age group
so reported (Table 3).
Considering the congressional concern about discrimination
against the elderly in the credit market, this survey reveals little
such behavior. Only 9% of the respondents aged 65 or older reported being refused credit (Table 2), 152 while only one in five of
m This result is difficult to explain under the model's theory. It may be that long-time
residents at one address who are denied credit are forced to attribute such a denial to a
personal characteristic because they simply cannot imagine another reason why they
would be turned down.
m This apparent lack of credit discrimination against the elderly may be due solely to
a propensity among those aged 65 or older to apply for credit less often, thereby reducing
the likelihood of credit refusals. It may also support the claims made by several creditors
at hearings on the ECOA that there is little credit discrimination against the elderly
because they are such excellent credit risks. See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hear-
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those refused credit saw the refusal as discriminatory (Table 3).
Sex discrimination seems absent from the results (Table 2), but
many women denied credit clearly see the denial as one linked to
illegal criteria (Table 3). Race presents the opposite situation,
with the difference in credit refusals revealed in Table 2 not
viewed by nonwhites as particularly discriminatory (Table 3). As
for marital status, creditors appear to deny credit more often to
non-married applicants than to married ones, even after adjusting for differences in income, employment, and other relevant
factors (Table 2). Approximately half of the non-married respondents denied credit identified an illegal criterion as the reason for
such denials (Table 3).

VI.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

A.

Youth Discrimination in the Granting of Credit

As indicated above, 153 there is a serious problem in the granting
of credit to those between the ages of 18 and 25: a larger proportion of this group than any other reports being denied credit and
nearly half views it as arising from the age factor. It would seem
that the ECOA offers these rejected applicants no legal recourse.
Despite its sweeping language that "[i]t shall be unlawful for
any creditor to discriminate against any applicant . . . on the
basis of . . . age, " 154 it is clear from other provisions of the Act, 155
Regulation B, 158 and the legislative history 157 that Congress intended that creditors be able to deny credit to young applicants
solely because of their age. This is due largely to what is perceived
as the legitimate interest of the creditor in selecting applicants
who possess suitable "credit histories" which reflect the willingness and ability of the applicant to repay loans. One creditor has
commented:
There is a clear relationship between age and ability to
pay. Younger people have not had the time to accumulate
possessions or capital, or acquire sizable incomes. They
need to purchase practically everything - home, furniture, applicances, and insurance. Moreover, their wants
ings, supra note 15, at 415-41 (statement of Richard F. Kerr on behalf of the National
Retail Merchants Association).
113
See Part V 8 3 supra, and Tables 2 and 3.
1
" 15 U.S.C. § 169l(a)(l) (1976).
113
15 U.S.C. § 169l(b)(2) (1976).
1
" 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2) (1979).
157
H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
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and needs are greater because young people are economically more active in our society. They are likely to have
young children to support. 158
The overgeneralizations in this statement are alarming. If ability to repay is the touchstone of creditworthiness, then it must be
asked why there should be a greater incidence of reported credit
refusals among younger respondents after adjustment for income,
employment, and home ownership. The answer is obvious: young
people are being denied credit because they are young, not because their income is low, because they have not lived in the area
long enough, or because they rent their residence. While it may
be granted that a rational creditor would ignore youth as a factor
in a good credit risk, much the same statement could have been
made twenty years ago about a divorced woman who showed
promise as someone willing and able to repay her loan. Just as
we no longer allow gender or marital status to serve as convenient
proxies for a careful assessment of the real creditworthiness of an
applicant, so we should not let age serve any longer. To allow age
to remain a valid credit-granting factor only perpetuates the stereotype of young borrowers as poor credit risks, permitting irrational prejudice against all young applicants to remain unchallenged. The ECOA and Regulation B should be amended to require creditors to base their decisions solely on rational factors
such as income, so that credit discrimination against the young
will be as impermissible as it now is against the old.

B.

Perceived Discrimination Against Women

Although there seems to be little difference between the reported incidence of credit refusals of men and women, those
women who have experienced unfavorable credit decisions are
quite likely to attribute the outcome to their gender. This special
sensitivity may be due to the fact that the ECOA was created and
publicized widely as a "women's bill," bringing a great deal of
publicity to the problems faced by women in obtaining credit. 159
There seems little need for remedial legislative action absent
greater evidence of actual discrimination. Creditors should be
,.. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 15, at 423 (statement of Richard F.
Ken on behalf of the National Retail Merchants Association).
••• Popular magazines helped to publicize the problem of credit discrimination against
women and the response of the ECOA. See Myerson, How to Fight for the Credit That is
Due You, REDBOOK, September 1974, at 76; What Women Should Know About Credit,
AM. HOME, September 1975, at 6; Women Move Toward Credit Equality, TIME, October
27, 1975, at 63.
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warned, however, that many women applying for credit may be
prone to viewing rejections as evidence of sex discrimination.
Careful attention must be paid to providing a full and accurate
statement of the reasons for taking any adverse action against a
female applicant so as to prevent such perceptions from developing into costly litigation.

C.

Marital Status Discrimination

Evidence of discrimination based on marital status found in
the survey is somewhat disheartening in light of the Board's enormous efforts to comply with the spirit of the ECOA by including
so many provisions in Regulation B designed to prevent such
discrimination. Indeed, there are so many sections of the regulations devoted to the prevention of discrimination based on marital status that it is doubtful that creditors who are unable to
afford large legal staffs can comply with the many nuances of
Regulation B. The problem here may lie in the lack of education
among creditors and consumers alike as to the provisions of the
Act and the regulations, education which would serve to alleviate
problems other than those relating to marital status as well.
1. Educating the creditors - Recognizing these problems, the
Board has undertaken an "advisory visit program" for member
banks, to assist creditors in understanding many of the complicated provisions of the regulations. Evidence gathered from the
examination of such banks indicates that ignorance of the law's
many parts is "the single most significant obstacle to full compliance."180 A recent report of the Board to Congress reveals that the
program is working well. 181
2. Educating the consumers - Responses to questions in the
survey reveal widespread ignorance of those criteria which creditors may not legally employ in the granting of credit. 182 As indicated below in Table 5, only 59% of the respondents knew that
race was an illegal criterion, while that figure for nonwhite
respondents was less than 50%. Only 52% overall and 43% of
women recognized sex as an impermissible factor to use in
granting credit, while only one in five respondents knew marital
status to be illegal. Fewer than one in five labelled age an illegal
criterion, possibly because of confusion over whether "age" referred to discrimination against the elderly or to age discrimination generally.
FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, supra note 1_25, at 4.
Id.
112
Such ignorance is no doubt due in part to the time when the survey was conducted-just six months after the ECOA amendments took effect.
,.. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
Ill
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TABLE 5
PERCEIVED ILLEGALITY

OF

VARIOUS CREDIT-GRANTING CRITERIA
Percent indicating they thought it was
ilh:iml m&: cregi tor to use :
Age

Race

Sex

18%

59'/,

53'/n

20'/,

[&mill'. income
Less than $5000
$5,000 - 9,999
$10,000 - 14,999
$15,000 - 19,999
$20,000 - 24,999
$25,000 or over

12
15
17
20
24
26

37
54
63
68
70
75

30
48
58
61
67
66

12
17
18
2-1
26
29

Ag!l Qf resn2nd1mt
18-25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 or older

15
25
20
21
15
9

70
80
63
60
51
33

63
72
55
55
47
28

22
27
25
22
14
8

;Edycation of r!l§l!2lld!lnt
8th grade or less
Some high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate

8
15
16
25
27

27
46
60
77
84

19
39
57
70
79

20
28
32

18
17
15

61
46
50

55
42
41

20
18
14

21
13

64
51

58
43

20
20

All

re11112ndent11

~

White
Black
Other
~

Male
Female

Marital status

6

13

The demographic factor which clearly distinguishes respondents on their knowledge of these criteria is, not surprisingly,
their level of education. This is a hopeful sign, however, for it
seems to indicate that educational efforts are likely to succeed.
Based on this assumption, the Board has issued a series of
consumer-oriented pamphlets designed to inform consumers in
layman's terms what the ECOA permits and prohibits and where
aggrieved applicants can go for help with their problems. 183 Representatives of the Board are also participating in a number of
seminars and presentations designed to give greater publicity to
•

0

See, e.g., BoARD

OPPORTUNITY

Ac:r

OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM,

AND WOMEN

(1977).
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consumer credit protection laws, including the ECOA. 184
An earlier version of Regulation B 185 required creditors to provide a summary statement of the ECOA 188 to all applicants,
whereas the current regulations only require that rejected applicants be provided such a statement. 187 Further educational efforts
might well include a 'return to the former provision, so that all
who apply for credit are made as fully aware of their rights under
the ECOA as they now are of interest rates under the Truth in
Lending Act. 188
D.

Race Discrimination and the Effects Test

Even after adjustment is made for a number of factors pertaining to race, for example, and length of time at present address,
the reported refusal rate for nonwhites is still higher than it is for
whites. If this reported difference represents an actual difference,
i.e. if creditors actually deny credit more often to nonwhites than
to whites, all other things being equal, how might it be decided
whether such conduct constitutes discrimination under the
ECOA? Since congressional intent was that the effects test be
applied, it is necessary to imagine how a court might apply that
test in a credit discrimination suit.
The Federal Reserve Board has suggested a scenario for such a
suit. 189 In the first step of a three-step process, the plaintiff would
attempt to show that a certain standard used for deciding to
whom credit is granted, although neutral on its face, results in the
denial of credit more often to one group than another. Following
the Albemarle Paper Co. procedure, 170 this would constitute a
prima facie showing of discrimination. The burden would then
shift to the creditor to demonstrate that the credit standard is
customarily applied to all applicants, and that the standard has
a manifest relationship to creditworthiness. The plaintiff would
then have the option of moving to the third step, which, analogizing to Albermarle, would involve attempting to prove that an
alternative credit standard would have a lesser adverse impact
'" BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 125, at 18-19.
40 Fed. Reg. 49,302 (1975).
111
Such a statement is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b) (1979).
111 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) (1979).
111
15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1976). "By 1977 levels of [interest] rate awareness reached 54.4
per cent for closed-end credit from institutional sources and 64.7 per cent and 71.3 per
cent for retail revolving credit and bank credit-card credit respectively." T. DURKIN & G.
ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 131, at 5.
'" Division of Consumer Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Equal Credit Opportunity, 63
FED. RES. BULL. 101 (1977).
11
• See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
1
"
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upon the affected group and that the alternative would serve the
creditor's legitimate interests as well as the original standard.
The Gilbert decision, 171 however, casts doubts on how seriously
the Supreme Court views the effects test as applied in Albemarle.
Given the lack of guidelines in Regulation B as to precisely how
the effects test applies in the credit area, "creditors and their
lawyers are justifiably concerned about the prospect of the effects
test being applied." 172 The Board suggests that those few creditors who use "demonstrably and statistically sound, empirically
derived credit systems" will have little trouble, since the very
existence of the system provides a rebuttal to alleged discrimination, in that it demonstrates the relationship of the criteria to the
creditor's legitimate interests. 173 For the majority of creditors who
use a "judgmental system," however, the Board is not so ~ptimistic. It merely suggests that lending institutions carefully examine
their practices in the credit-granting process to ensure that they
are "rational" and that factors are used which have "a manifest
relationship to creditworthiness. " 174
Whether the Board should attempt to end this confusion by
specifically regulating the precise items which may and may not
be used in the granting of credit is, however, still open to doubt.
There is of yet no judicial interpretation of the effects test in this
area. Since the test itself was created by the courts, it can be
argued that it would be best to wait for a judicial decision as to
how the test is to apply under the ECOA. In addition, as one
commentator has made clear, 175 there are vast differences between the employment and credit arenas which may cause a strict
interpretation of the regulations to reduce the amount of available credit, thereby harming the very people the ECOA was designed to assist.

E.

Administrative Enforcement

1. Current enforcement efforts - Within the past three years,
a number of agencies have taken steps which indicate that the
ECOA may be vigorously enforced even if private actions remain
scarce. The first Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent order
171 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See text accompanying notes
69-72 supra.
172
Division of Consumer Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, supra note 169, at 107.
'" Id.
'" Id.
175 Comment, The 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 BAYLOR
L. REv. 633 (1976).
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issued under the Act 178 came in February 1977 against a Chicago
mail-order house which had discriminated in several ways on the
bases of sex and marital status. 177 In November 1978, the FTC
announced that it had reached a settlement with Bloomingdale's
department store whereby the store paid a civil fine of $50,000
and agreed to contact all rejected applicants whose rights might
have been violated and invite them to reapply. The store was
accused of failing to consider the income of credit applicants
derived from alimony, child support payments, and part-time
employment, as well as neglecting to inform rejected applicants
of the precise reasons for the actions. 178 The FTC enjoined Montgomery Ward in a consent judgment from failing to provide a
statement of the specific reasons applicants were denied credit. 179
More specifically, the company was prohibited from failing to
disclose several factors actually considered in taking adverse actions, from giving false or misleading reasons for adverse action
that the company actually did not use in its credit scoring system,
and from giving general reasons for adverse action rather than
specific ones. 180 Most recently, in the first action under the ECOA
involving a finance company, the Commission issued a consent
order against Westinghouse Credit Company requiring redress for
alleged past violations of the Act and implementation of an educational program to prevent future violations. 181
The Justice Department has also acted under the authority
given it by the 1976 amendments to the ECOA. 182 In April 1978,
it filed its first action under the Act, alleging that a Dallas real
estate developer refused to sell home sites or make mortgages
available to blacks. 183 A court order was sought to enjoin the de171 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) , 98,065 (1978), referring to In the Matter of Aldens,
Inc., FTC Consent Order, File No. 772 3017, February 14, 1978.
177 Aldens violated no fewer than eight regulations and was ordered to cease and desist
from the following:
discrimination against credit applicants on account of sex or marital status, and
employing these factors in a credit scoring system contrary to Regulation B;
failing to recognize the receipt of regular child support payments as income when
evaluating credit applications; requesting the name of the applicant's spouse
upon application for an unsecured credit account in a non-community property
state; failing to preserve certain credit records including reports from credit reporting agencies; and neglecting to provide rejected credit applicants with specific
reasons within the specified time period.
Id.
11• Bloomingdale's Settles in Equal Credit Case, Ann Arbor News, December 21, 1978,
at B-4, col. 1.
171 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) , 97,732 (June 15, 1979).
,so Id.
1• 1 5 CoNS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), Report No. 288 (September 18, 1979), at 2.
'" 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (1976).
,a 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), Report No. 252 (May 5, 1978), at 6.
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fendant from further violations of the Act and to require the
developer to correct the lingering effects of its alleged discriminatory practices. 184 The case was settled in November 1978 by entry
of a consent decree providing for injunctive and affirmative relief.185 The Department also brought suit in May 1978 against a
Pennsylvania kitchenware company, alleging that it had discriminated against blacks, Hispanics, and married persons in installment purchases by applying different standards of creditworthiness to different demographic subgroups. 188 In addition to injunctive relief, the suit seeks to make the company take corrective
measures including the payment of monetary damages. 187 These
cases are typical of the others brought by the Justice Department
in the past two years. 188
The Federal Reserve Board continues to emphasize examinations of member banks as the chief weapon in its potential enforcement arsenal. 189 Governor Jackson of the Board has informed
Id.
REPoRT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL ON THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT FOR THE
YEAR 1978, reprinted in 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), 97,790 (1979).
111 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), Report No. 253 (May 18. 1978), at 5.
111 Id.
111 A case filed in May 1978, United States v. Sumner Advertising Agency (W.D. Tex.),
alleges that a marketing company, two of its employees, and two land developers violated
the ECOA by discouraging blacks, Hispanics, persons on public assistance, and persons
over 65 years of age from applying for financing the purchase of residential land. A consent
decree was filed in September 1978 against three of the five defendants who had ceased
marketing residential property, with the proviso that if any of the three were to resume
the residential property business, the federal government would have to be notified and
seminannual reports submitted demonstrating compliance with the ECOA. As of February 1979, the case was still pending against the remaining two defendants. REPORT OF THE
ATJ'ORNEY GENERAL, supra note 185. A case filed in October 1978 alleged sex and marital
status discrimination by a mortgage company in selecting applicants to be given mortgage
loans. In United States v. Citizens Mortgage Co. (E.D. Va.), a court-approved consent
decree filed simultaneously with the complaint provided for injunctive relief, application
of uniform and specific lending standards spelled out in the decree, a program for educating employees of the defendant about their responsibilities under the decree and the
ECOA, notice to real estate brokers who deal with the defendant of non-discriminatory
loan standards now used, and public notice of the same. The decree applies to defendant's
ten offices in five states. Id. Most recently, in January 1979, a consent decree was announced by the Department for a suit brought against a Kentucky bank, which permanently enjoins the bank from discriminating in favor of male loan applicants, discounting
the income of married women in loan applications, ignoring sources of income other than
from employment, and failing to provide a written notice of denial to loan applicant. 5
CONS. CRED. GumE (CCH), Report No. 271 (January 25, 1979) at 2-3.
111
Between April 1977 and August 1978, Board examiners found nearly 18,000 possible
violations of Regulation B among inspections of 861 state member banks, almost half
relating to nonconforming application forms. Another quarter related to incomplete notifications of reasons for credit denials. The major substantive violations of Regulation B
concerned improper requests for the signature of a nonapplicant spouse. "A good number
of these institutions have now been brought into compliance after further clarification as
to what Regulation B requires. The Federal Reserve Banks are dealing with the others on
IM

185
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Congress that the agency's enforcement program "seeks to effect
voluntary compliance whenever possible," although he promised
that the Board would take "appropriate administrative action"
(including referral of some matters to the Attorney General)
"when warranted." 190 Jackson also stated that the Board "could
decide to make the identity of the [offending] institutions public" if repeated violations occur and voluntary compliance is not
obtained. 191
2. Enforcement guidelines proposed - Another sign of the
growing commitment to making the ECOA work came when five
enforcing agencies 192 proposed uniform guidelines for administrative enforcement of the ECOA, Regulation B, and the Fair Houseing Act, 193 the general objective of which is to require corrective
action from violators of the regulations and to promote future
compliance. 194 For example, if a creditor runs afoul of the prohibition against discouraging applications on a prohibited basis, 195 the
proposed policy suggests that "[t]he creditor will be required to
solicit credit applications from the discouraged class through affirmative advertising . . . subject to review by the enforcing
agency." 198 Even more severe is the proposed action to be taken
against those creditors who employ discriminatory elements in
their credit evaluation systems. A creditor found to have discriminated in this manner "will be required to re-evaluate, in accordance with a non-discriminatory written loan policy, all credit
applications rejected during a period of tim_e to be determined by
the agency." 197 In addition, all applicants rejected by the creditor
under the discriminatory system must be invited to reapply, and
refunds furnished to them of "any fees or costs paid . . . in
connection with their original applications." 198
As of November 1979, these guidelines had been sent to an
interdepartmental "Examination Council" made up of representatives of the five agencies responsible for their enforcement. This
a case-by-case basis." Statement of Philip C. Jackson, Jr., Governor, Federal Reserve
Board, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the
House Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, September 15,
1978, reprinted in 64 FED. REs. BULL. 742, 743-44 (1978).
''° Id. at 744.
"' Id.
112
The agencies involved were the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, and the National Credit Union Administration.
"' 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1976).
"' 43 Fed. Reg. 29,256 (1978).
115
See note 81 supra for the Regulation B definition of "prohibited basis."
'" 43 Fed. Reg. 29,256 at 29,257 (1978).
117
Id.
111
Id.
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Council will rewrite the guidelines in accordance with their potential feasibility as determined by, for example, bank examiners
for the Federal Reserve Board checking with various types of
regulated institutions. 199 The guidelines will "probably not be
submitted again for public comment," and will go into effect
sometime in early 1980. 200
3. Greater enforcement initiative required - At this stage, it
is difficult to assess the performance of those agencies charged
with enforcing the ECOA. According to the Federal Reserve
Board's 1978 report to Congress, agency action in this area has
come largely in response to consumer complaints, which have
been few in number. 201 In his 1978 report to Congress on the
ECOA, 202 the Attorney General suggested three possible explannations for the lack of complaints and lawsuits:· consumer ignorance of the law; 203 the willingness of creditors to change a practice brought to their attention by enforcement agencies, thereby
avoiding a lawsuit; and the tendency of creditors to alter credit
standards so as to grant credit to rejected applicants who complain to the creditor, thereby allowing the underlying discrimination to continue. 204
Whether enforcement agencies should continue to act only
upon receipt of consumer complaints is highly questionable. Although Congress intended that private actions be the primary
enforcement tool against creditor violations of the ECOA, 205 it is
also clear that the tripartite division of enforcement among private citizens, the regulatory agencies, and the Attorney General
was believed necessary to ensure the strong enforcement of the
Act. 208 Mere reactive measures fail to reflect the vigorous efforts
which those who passed the Act thought were necessary to deal
with equal credit violations.
1
" Telephone interview with Staff Attorney, Division of Consumer and Community
Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5,
1979).
200

Id.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, supra note 125, at 2.
ATI'ORNEY GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976, reprinted in 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,040 (1978)
[hereinafter referred to as 1977 ATTORNEY GENERAL REPoRT].
• See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra and Table 5 for evidence of such ignorance.
204
1977 ATI'ORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 202.
2a1 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d SeSB. 13 (1976), reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE CoNG.
& Ao. NEWS 403, 415.
'"' "Since discrimination is inherently insidious, almost presumptively intentional, yet
often difficult to detect and ferret out, the Committee believes that strong enforcement
of this Act is essential to accomplishing its purposes. The bill therefore provides enforcement opportunities of three kinds." Id.
:tat
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Support for this position is found in the survey. Respondents
were asked if they had ever been treated unfairly in any credit
transactions, and if so, whether any action was taken. 207 The 388
respondents who reported being treated unfairly and who took
action took a total of 535 actions, 61.5% of which involved complaining to the creditor. 208 In only thirteen cases did a consumer
complain to a public third party such as the government or the
media about unfair treatment, 209 reflecting the paucity of complaints received by federal enforcement agencies. 210 Although the
problems most often mentioned by those who believed that they
had been treated unfairly involved a credit refusal or limitation,
not a single respondent complaining to a public third party mentioned the problem of credit availability. 211 The number of cases
is too small to allow generalizations, but this result certainly
suggests that the agencies charged with enforcing the ECOA fail
to receive a representative sampling of consumer credit complaints.212 To permit these agencies to act only when prodded by
consumer complaints thus risks exclusion of many equal credit
violations, a result contrary to the vigorous eradication of unfair
credit practices that the ECOA was designed to ensure.
Despite this conclusion, few can doubt that the ECOA enforcement agencies generally lack the resources required to institute
aggressive investigations of creditor practices in their respective
areas to discover potential violations of the Act and Regulation
B. If such resources were made available, other agencies could
create educational enforcement programs similar to the successful one of the Federal Reserve Board. 213 Congressional recognition
of the expertise of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice, 214 which formed the basis for inclusion of that agency in
the ECOA enforcement arsenal, 215 suggests a more forceful role for
the newly reorganized Housing and Credit Section of the Division.218 Creditors would thereby be put on notice that their activi207 The questions were: "In your opinion, have you ever been treated unfairly in your
credit transactions? What was the problem? Did you try to do anything about this? What
did you do?"
,.. T. DURKIN & G. ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 131, at 29.
,.. This figure represents 2.5 percent of all actions taken. Id. at 31.
21
• See text accompanying notes 201-04 supra.
111
T. DURKIN & G. ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 131, at 29.
112
Id. at 30 .
.,. See notes 189-91 and accompanying text supra.
211 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CooE CONG.
& Ao. NEWS 403, 415.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691e(g), (h) (1976).
"' 1977 AITORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 202.
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ties would be as closely monitored as are those of employers and
those in the housing field.
CONCLUSION

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B represent
an attempt to ensure that all creditworthy individuals are provided with equal access to the economic necessity of credit. While
Congress intended that the law be a balancing of consumer and
creditor interests, examination of survey results indicates that
current pactices may not be achieving that goal. The young, the
unmarried, and the nonwhite all report having experienced unfavorable credit decisions more often than the rest of the sample,
with young and female respondents likely to view such adverse
decisions as the result of creditor concern with factors which the
law requires they ignore.
Changes in the law and regulations, of course, can alter only
creditor practices and not unfounded consumer perceptions. Furthermore, the results of a single survey serve only to reveal potential problem areas at the time the survey was conducted. The
suggestions for reform offered here represent changes designed to
respond to both the problems suggested by the survey and congressional intent as to how such problems should be handled.
Whether the ECOA and Regulation B prove effective in allowing
access to the credit market regardless of immutable characteristics can only be discovered by further examination, including
surveys, designed to measure the effectiveness of such reform.

-James A. Burns, Jr.

